Women and Justice: Topics: Gender discrimination, Gender violence in conflict, Gender-based violence in general, Sexual violence and rape

This Decree adopted the National Public Policy of Gender Equity (‘Política Pública Nacional de Equidad de Género’). It aims for the development of specific plans and programs that guarantee the rights of forcibly displaced women, including their right to a violence-free life. The policy also acknowledged the importance of the differential approach from the gender perspective, taking into account the particularities arising out of urban and rural context, Afro-Colombian, indigenous, and peasant women. In turn, the Decree created a cross-sectional commission in charge of the coordinating the implementation and technical and operational follow-up of the National Public Policy on Gender Equality.

Este Decreto adoptó la Política Pública Nacional de Equidad de Género. Esta tiene como objetivo el desarrollo de planes y programas específicos que garanticen los derechos de las mujeres que han sido desplazadas forzosamente, incluyendo su derecho a una vida libre de violencia. La política también reconoció la importancia del enfoque diferencial desde la perspectiva de género, tomando en cuenta las particularidades que surgen del contexto urbano y rural, las mujeres afrocolombianas, indígenas y campesinas. A su vez, el Decreto creó una comisión transversal encargada de coordinar la implementación y el seguimiento técnico y operativo de la Política Pública Nacional de Igualdad de Género.

The National Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Resolution Nº 1325/2000 of the UN Security Council on Women, Peace and Security was approved by the Angolan President in June 2017, revoking all legislation that contravenes it. The UN Resolution Nº 1325/2000 emphasizes the uneven impact of armed conflicts for men and women, and appeals for a higher degree of participation of women, and to the integration of gender equality in the prevention, management, and resolution of armed conflicts. As such, it highlights the importance of gender equality in all phases of construction of peace and gives women the role not as victims, but as important actors in the peacemaking process. The National Plan follows those principles by planning to: 1) increase women’s participation in the construction of peace and related decision-making, 2) guarantee the formation and habilitation of women and girls, 3) promote and protect women’s and girls’ human rights in zones of conflict and post-conflict through empowerment and elimination of gender and sexual violence, among other objectives. In this respect, the plan also includes a series of activities, goals and execution times, and the expected result as an effective policy to implement the plan's objectives.

O Plano Nacional de Ação para a Implementação da Resolução Nº 1325/2000 do Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas sobre Mulheres, Paz e Segurança foi aprovado pelo Presidente da Angola em Junho de 2017, revogando toda a legislação que viola o plano. A Resolução Nº 1325/2000 da ONU enfatiza o impacto desigual dos conflitos armados para homens e mulheres, e apela para um maior grau de participação das mulheres, e para a integração da igualdade de gênero na prevenção, administração e resolução dos conflitos armados. Como tal, ele realça a importância da igualdade de gênero em todas as fases de construção da paz e dá às mulheres papeis não de vítimas, mas de importantes atrizes no processo de pacificação. O Plano Nacional segue esses princípios ao planejar: 1) o aumento da participação feminina na construção da paz e relacionada a tomadas de decisão, 2) a garantia da formação e habilitação de mulheres e garotas, 3) a promoção e proteção dos direitos humanos de mulheres e garotas em zonas de conflito e pós-conflito por meio do empoderamento e eliminação de violência sexual e de gênero, junto de outros objetivos. Nesse sentido, o plano também inclui uma série de atividades, metas e tempos de execução, e o resultado esperado como uma política efetiva para implementar os objetivos do plano.

The Criminal Code defines rape and the persecution of a person based on his or her sex as a crime against humanity (Article 172). It also includes rape or forcible prostitution under threat to a person’s life or limb and/or the threat to the life or the limb of a loved one as a crime of war (Article 180). English translation available from ILO and LegislatiOnline through External URL.

Provides for a criminal penalty of not less than five years for any person who commits certain specified offenses as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, including (1) assuming and exercising a right of ownership over a person, in particular in the form of trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation or forced labor; and (2) raping a person of the female gender or, after she has been forcibly made pregnant, confining her unlawfully with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population, forcing a person to tolerate a sexual act of comparable severity or forcing a person into prostitution or to be sterilized. Unofficial English translation available here.

Article 28. Responsibility of commanders and other superiors. Under this provision, military commanders are held criminally responsible for crimes committed by armed forces under their effective command and control, such as rape and any sexual violence used in war. This applies to instances where the superior knew or should have known about such crimes, or failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent their commission. The crimes committed by the armed forces must have been a result of the failure of the commander to properly exercise control over them. In addition, there must be evidence beyond any reasonable doubt that the commander is responsible and the crimes were sufficiently widespread so that it is evident that they occurred during the ordinary implementation of the military action for which the commander is responsible. The goal of this provision is to encourage commanders and superiors to prevent effectively the perpetration of crimes by their forces.

This judgment was issued as part of the assessment proceedings subsequent to a judicial review by the state. This review investigated systemic and individual failures resulting in police officers committing widespread violent and traumatic sexual assaults and rapes of women and girls during the civil unrest in October 2019. The court was tasked with assessing the amount of compensation to be awarded to the 18 applicants on whose behalf the review was conducted. The basis for this award was the previous judgment of the court that: (i) failures by the Inspector General of Police resulted in violence, torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment against the applicants in violation of section 19(3) of the Constitution; (ii) failures by the Inspector General of Police further resulted in violations of the right of applicants to dignity and equality under sections 19(1) and 20 of the Constitution; and (iii) failures by the Clerk of the National Assembly and the Malawi Police Service to investigate and prosecute the allegations of violence and rape resulted in violations of the right of access to justice under section 41 of the Constitution. The court also found numerous violations of domestic laws, including the Police Act, as well as Malawi’s obligations under human rights treaties, including CEDAW. Under section 46(4) of the Constitution, the courts have the power to award compensation to any person whose rights or freedoms have been unlawfully denied or violated. The court applied the principle of restitution intergrum, or making the victim whole as they would have been prior to the violation, and turned to international precedents when evaluating appropriate amounts. The court noted that any amount should be elevated when caused by a “constitutional duty bearer,” such as the police, and that lack of investigation was an aggravating factor. The court awarded different amounts to each applicant depending on the circumstances of their particular harm, ranging from K4,500,000-10,000,000, in addition to costs.

The defendants, both Serbs and a police officer, were accused of forcibly abducting a Kosovar Albanian civilian female and raping her, thus committing the offense of War Crime Against the Civilian Population, in violation of Article 153 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo in addition to other offences. The court of first instance acquitted both defendants of war crimes, but the acquittal was annulled by the appellate court, which sentenced them to 10 and 12 years of imprisonment respectively. Both defendants appealed. The Supreme Court held that minor discrepancies of a witness’s statement should not be treated as discrediting. The tribunal found it proven that two Serbs did rape the victim, determined that the victim’s and witnesses’ statements were credible insofar as they did not relate to the identification of the suspects, and disagreed that the lack of medical report raised doubts that the rape occurred at all because such a report’s absence was well justified by the prevailing circumstance of an armed conflict. However, the court held that it had not been proven beyond any reasonable doubt, as required by law, that the defendants were the persons who committed the rape due to deficiencies in the suspect identification process. For example, the initial process had been carried out by the KLA MP years ago, and the court lacked evidence on how the process was carried out, the photos shown to the victim, and whether statements by the KLA blurred the victim’s memory. Subsequent identification was deficient because the defendants’ photos were obviously dissimilar from the other photos shown and the victim and witnesses thereby may have been guided in identifying the perpetrators. Further, the victim’s and witnesses’ description of the perpetrators were either general and not sufficient to conclude that the defendants were the perpetrators, or not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence. As a result, the tribunal granted the defendants’ appeal and acquitted the defendants. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

Between April 1992 and November 1993, during the Bosnian War, Gojko Janković, a paramilitary leader within the Srpska Republika Army, participated in a widespread and systematic attack on the non-Serb civilian population of Foča. Janković’s unit methodically captured civilians, detained them separately according to gender, and killed dozens of men. During this time, Janković raped at least five girls and women; the soldiers under his command raped scores more. In addition, Janković and a co-perpetrator kept two teenage girls in sexual slavery at a nearby house for over one year. In 2005, Janković voluntarily surrendered and was transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”). Shortly thereafter, the Referral Branch of the ICTY referred Janković’s case to the Court of BiH. In 2007, the Court of BiH found Janković guilty of Crimes against Humanity under Article 172(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH and sentenced him to 34 years imprisonment. In 2010, Janković appealed his conviction to the ICTY, arguing the Court of BiH convicted him under a law, the Criminal Code of BiH, which did not exist at the time his crimes were committed. The ICTY denied his appeal.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

From the spring of 1992 to the autumn of 1993, during the Bosnian War, Predrag Kujundžić, a commander in the local military and later police force, led several attacks against non-Serb civilians in Doboj. During that time, he incited, aided, and abetted the murder, rape, imprisonment, and persecution of non-Serb civilians. In addition, from June to December 1992, Kujundžić forced a Muslim minor into sexual slavery by use of force and threats to kill the victim’s mother and younger sister. Kujundžić repeatedly raped the victim, forced her to have sexual intercourse with soldiers, and controlled every aspect of her life. In 2009, the Court of BiH found Kujundžić guilty of Crimes against Humanity under Article 172(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH. The Court found several aggravating circumstances present in Kujundžić’s case, including Kujundžić’s status as a commander, the motives for the attack, the large number of victims, and the fact that the victim of rape and sexual slavery was a minor. The Court accordingly sentenced Kujundžić to 22 years imprisonment. A panel of the Appellate Division later reduced his prison sentence to 17 years.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

In August 1992, during the Bosnian War, Slavko Lalović served as a security guard at an elementary school turned into a prison for unlawfully detained civilians in Kalinovik. While on duty, Lalović allowed two soldiers from the Republika Srpska Army to enter the makeshift prison and rape a detained woman. Lalović also treated detainees inhumanely on several occasions. In 2011, the Court of BiH found Lalović guilty of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 173(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH. The following year, a panel of the Appellate Division revised Lalović’s sentence, convicting him under the law in effect at the time the crimes were committed, Article 142(1) of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Lalović’s five-year prison sentence remained unchanged. Notably, this is one of the few instances in which a person in a position of authority was found guilty by the Court of BiH of aiding and abetting a rape as a war crime during the Bosnian war.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

In May 1993, during the Bosnian War, Velibor Bogdanović, a member of the Croatian Defence Council, and five unidentified soldiers ransacked the home of a couple in Mostar. The group stole jewelry from the home and took the husband to the local prison where he was unlawfully detained for 30 days. In addition, Bogdanović raped the wife. In 2011, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BiH”) found Bogdanović guilty of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 173(1), as read together with Article 180(1) and Article 29, of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“CC BiH”). In July 2015, the Constitutional Court of BiH overturned Bogdanović’s conviction, finding that it had been based on an inapplicable law. And in September 2015, the Appellate Division of the Court of BiH revised Bogdanović’s sentence, finding him guilty of the criminal offense of War Crimes against Civilians under Article 142(1) of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The Court imposed the minimum sentence on Bogdanović – five years imprisonment – reasoning that the accused was a married father, that he had been 22-years-old at the time that he committed the crime, that he had committed no criminal offense since the war, and that he had apologized to the victim after the war and offered her assistance.

Revised second instance verdict in English available here.

The cases against Daniel Martinez, Manuel Pop Sun, Reyes Collin Gualip and Lieutenant Carlos Carías, First Tribunal of Criminal Sentencing, Narco-trafficking and Crimes against the Environment (Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, 2011. Crimes against humanity, genocide. In 2009, following the decision in the case of the “Las dos Erres” Massacre, the Supreme Court of Justice ordered the State to continue cases against those involved is the massacres perpetrated during Guatemala’s civil war. A case was brought against Daniel Martinez, Manuel Pop Sun, Reyes Collin Gualip and Lieutenant Carlos Carías in the First Tribunal of Criminal Sentencing, Narco-trafficking and Crimes against the Environment in Guatemala. The accused were sentenced to 6,060 years in prison for crimes against humanity, including sexual violations, and the murder of 201 locals from Dos Erres, of which they will each serve the maximum of 50 years. The conviction of four members of Guatemalan Special Forces was a step towards fulfilling the requirements imposed by the Inter-American Court to end impunity in Guatemala. Another Guatemalan ex-Soldier, Pedro Pimental Rios, was sentenced to 6,060 years by a three judge panel after being extradited from the United States just months later on March 12, 2012. He will also serve the maximum sentence in Guatemala, 50 years.

Los casos son contra Daniel Martínez, Manuel Pop Sun, Reyes Collin Gualip, y el teniente Carlos Carías, Primer Tribunal de Sentencias Penales, Narco-Tráfico y Delitos contra el Medio Ambiente (Tribunal Primero de Sentencia Penal, Narcoactividad y Delitos contra el Ambiente de Guatemala, 2011). Los crímenes alegados son humanitarios y de genocidio. En 2009, tras la decisión en el caso de la Masacre de "Las dos Erres", la Corte Suprema de Justicia ordenó al Estado que continuara los casos contra los involucrados, en la masacre perpetrada durante la guerra civil de Guatemala. Los casos fueron traídos contra Daniel Martínez, Manuel Pop Sun, Reyes Collin Gualip, y el teniente Carlos Carías en el Primer Tribunal de Sentencias Penales, Narco-Tráfico y Crímenes contra el Medio Ambiente en Guatemala. Los acusados fueron sentenciados a 6,060 años de prisión por los crímenes humanitarios, incluyendo violaciones sexuales, y el asesinato de 201 lugareños de Dos Erres, de los cuales cada uno servirá el máximo de 50 años. La noción de cuatro miembros de las Fuerzas Especiales de Guatemala fue un paso hacia el cumplimiento de los requisitos impuestos por la Corte Interamericana para poner fin a la impunidad en Guatemala. Otro ex soldado guatemalteco, Pedro Pimental Rios, fue condenado a 6,060 años por un panel de tres jueces luego de ser extraditado de los Estados Unidos unos meses después, el 12 de marzo de 2012. Él también cumplirá la pena máxima en Guatemala, 50 años.

The defendant pleaded not guilty to one charge of attempted rape of an 11 years and 10 months old female, under section 376(1) of the Penal Code. The court found that the complainant gave different versions as to the events that occurred. It found the complainant’s evidence unreliable. The court concluded that the complainant was the initiator of the events that led to the attempted intercourse. The court found that there was an attempt at sexual intercourse. In view of medical evidence that revealed that the hymen was intact and that ejaculation may have occurred outside the complainant, the court found doubt as to whether penetration occurred. The court highlighted that consent was not a defense to rape as the complainant was under the age of 14 at the time at issue. Nonetheless, consent becomes relevant to punishment, as a minimum sentence is prescribed for rape which occurs “without the consent of the victim”. The court found that the complainant gave her consent to the defendant’s attempt to have sexual intercourse with her and that she gave a real consent, not vitiated by immaturity or by any of the other factors specified in section 90 P.C. The court convicted the defendant of attempted rape and imposed sentences of one year imprisonment and three strokes.

The plaintiff, Ng Hoi Sze and defendant Yuen Sha Sha shared a college dorm room. Yuen Sha Sha discovered a video recorder that plaintiff’s boyfriend, Tse Chi Pan, placed in the room, which recorded Yuen Sha Sha while she was undressing. Ms. Sha Sha had Mr. Pan expelled from the University and the plaintiff was expelled from the dorm room. The plaintiff filed a nuisance claim against Ms. Sha Sha and her boyfriend, Fung Ka Fai, the other defendant, who was a student at another university. The plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to introduce a claim for sexual harassment under the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Cap. 480. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that there was unlawful sexual harassment in contravention of section 39(3) of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Cap. 480, by the defendants’ engaging in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in relation to the plaintiff and, consequently, the plaintiff suffered embarrassment, humiliation and shock. The plaintiff sought damages under section 76 of the Ordinance. The Ordinance stated that a person sexually harasses a woman if the person (i) makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for sexual favors to her, or (ii) engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in relation to her in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the circumstances, would have anticipated that she would be offended, humiliated or intimidated, or the person, alone or together with other persons, engages in conduct of a sexual nature that creates a sexually hostile or intimidating work environment for her. The question in this case was whether there were allegations that the defendants, or either of them, engaged in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in relation to the plaintiff. The first judge held that the plaintiff’s claim was facially deficient because she did not plead any sexual conduct that she found offensive. The second judge agreed with the first judge’s assertions. However, notably, the second judge stated that when a female student’s roommate engages, in their shared room, without the female student’s consent, in conduct of a sexual nature with another person, that conduct is capable of being considered sexual harassment of the female student. A reasonable person would have anticipated that the female student would be offended by such conduct. Thus, had the plaintiff simply properly pleaded what the sexually offensive conduct was, she would have stated a claim against the defendants for sexual harassment and would have been able to pursue a strong claim against the defendants.

The claimant was born in Somalia and left the country when her home was destroyed and four men attempted to rape her. The claimant sought residence in the Netherlands as a refugee under Immigration Act 2000. She argued that women in Central and Southern Somalia were systematically exposed to inhuman treatment. The claimant submitted reports that abuse and rape of women, by civilians and armed groups, was frequent, and that displaced women were particularly vulnerable during their flight. Gang rape was widespread, and victims (including young girls and boys) were selected at random. Further, rape is almost never prosecuted and the victims are discriminated against because they are seen as “unclean.” The report further stated that women in Somalia do not have access to justice and receive no protection from authorities. Human Rights Watch and UN reports also described women as suffering the brunt of abuse and repression cultivated by al-Shabaab’s decrees, including forced marriage, female genital mutilation (“FGM”) and gender-based violence. The District Court opined that women are in a vulnerable position in Central and Southern Somalia and, therefore, run the risk of suffering violence and human rights violations, and cannot obtain effective protection. They are therefore a group worthy of protection from inhuman treatment and torture.

Rosaria, a thirteen-year-old schoolgirl, was raped by defendant teacher, and consequently contracted a venereal disease. The rape occurred in the defendant's home, which Rosaria entered with the intent of picking up some past school papers that the defendant had failed to bring to school on multiple occasions. After bringing this incident to the Head Teacher's attention, it was uncovered that the defendant had done this before, that measures had been taken to warn or protect students from the defendant, that the defendant had only received a verbal warning, and that the previous student victim had transferred to another school. In his defense, the defendant claimed that he was in a relationship with Rosaria, to which she consented, as evidenced by a Valentine's Day card that Rosaria had given him. The High Court held that the defendant breached the duty of care that he owed to his pupils and was therefore negligent, noting that it is the duty of a school teacher to care for his pupils, as would a father for his family. The Court reasoned that school teachers are in a position of moral superiority, and a young schoolgirl's "consent" is fictitious in light of the ethics compelling a teacher to not engage in sexual relations with schoolgirls, a young girl's cognitive inability to truly consent, as well as Section 138 of the penal code, which states that defilement of a girl under the age of 16 is an offense. Notably, the Court held that society's indignation of this type of behavior ought to be reflected in the amount of damages awarded. The Court entered a judgment in favor of Rosaria for K 45,000,000 for her pain and suffering, medical expenses, aggravated damages, and mental torture. Furthermore, the Court held that the School, Ministry of Education, and the Attorney General are vicariously liable for this judgment, noting that the government is responsible for all school going children in the care of its agents, including teachers like the defendant.

The appellant, convicted of hiring two workers to kill her abusive husband, argued for a reduced sentence. The court held that a lesser sentence is permitted only when there are "truly convincing" circumstances or where a life sentence is disproportionate or unjust. Expert testimony regarding battering and its effects showed how her behavior fit a well-known pattern for abused women. The court found this testimony convincing and held that the appellant's use of third parties to kill her husband did not invalidate her claim to be a victim of battering. Additionally, the court held that appellant's failure to testify should have no effect on her credibility. The court reduced her sentence but declined to acquit the appellant because of the premeditated nature of the act.

Die appellant, wat skuldig bevind is aan die huur van twee werkers om haar geweldadige man dood te maak, het aangevoer vir 'n verlaagde vonnis. Die hof het beslis dat 'n verlaagde vonnis slegs toegelaat word as daar 'werklik oortuigende' omstandighede is, of as 'n lewenslange vonnis buite verhouding of onregverdig is. 'n Getuienis van kundiges rakende die geweld en die gevolge daarvan het getoon hoe haar gedrag pas by 'n bekende patroon vir mishandelde vroue. Die hof het bevind dat hierdie getuienis oortuigend was en het bevind dat die applikant se gebruik van derde partye om haar man te vermoor nie die feit ongeldig gemaak dat sy ‘n slagoffer van geweld is nie. Verder het die hof beslis dat haar versuim om te getuig geen effek op haar geloofwaardigheid moes hê nie. Die hof het haar vonnis verminder, maar het geweier om die applikant vry te laat weens die voorbedagte aard van die handeling.

The appellant was convicted of defilement of a girl under the age of 14 years and sentenced to 14 years imprisonment with ten strokes of the cane. The appellant appealed his conviction and the sentence as being excessive for a first offense. The Court dismissed the appeal of the conviction as the complainant identified the appellant and medical evidence is no longer necessary to convict an accused if the evidence was sufficiently cogent. The "defilement" conviction was substituted with rape and the appellant was sentenced to ten years imprisonment.

Court recognized the special vulnerability of women in situations of armed conflict and ordered the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, as well as the Attorney General, to implement and revise programs to protect victims and witnesses of armed conflicts, consistent with national and international law and practice.

La Corte reconoció la vulnerabilidad de las mujeres en situaciones de conflicto armado y guerras y ordenó al Ministerio del Interior y al Ministerio de Justicia, así como al Fiscal General, implementar y revisar programas de protección a víctimas y testigos de conflictos armados, acordes con las normas nacionales y derecho y práctica internacionales.

The Court recognized the special constitutional protection that women displaced by armed conflict are entitled to, as well as international obligations applicable to women displaced by armed conflict. The Court ordered the creation of programs to bring attention to the plight of displaced women and to strengthen their constitutional rights. The court also granted protective orders to more than 600 displaced women. Finally, the court alerted the Attorney General of numerous sexual crimes committed against women during Colombia's armed conflict.

La Corte reconoció la protección constitucional especial a la que tienen derecho las mujeres desplazadas por conflictos armados y guerras, así como las obligaciones internacionales que se aplican a ellas. La Corte ordenó la creación de programas para llamar la atención sobre la difícil situación de las mujeres desplazadas y fortalecer sus derechos constitucionales. El tribunal también otorgó órdenes de protección a más de 600 mujeres desplazadas. Finalmente, el tribunal alertó al Fiscal General sobre numerosos delitos sexuales cometidos contra mujeres durante el conflicto armado de Colombia.

In 2010, the Avon Global Center for Women and Justice held a conference in Washington, DC to discuss advances and obstacles to securing justice for women and girls in conflict and post-conflict areas.

Musema, the accused, was the director of a tea factory during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and was accused of organizing and taking part in attacks on Tutsi communes. The Trial Chamber found that Musema had taken part in at least four separate attacks, and that he personally participated in a rape and in so doing, had encouraged others to rape the victim. Musema was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Chamber adopted the definition of rape and sexual violence set forth in the landmark Akayesu decision, and further stated that “variations on the acts of rape may include acts which involve the insertions of objects and/or the use of bodily orifices not considered to be intrinsically sexual.” Concurring with the approach set forth in Akayesu, the Chamber stated that the “essence of rape is not the particular details of the body parts and objects involved, but rather the aggression that is expressed in a sexual manner under conditions of coercion.” The Trial Chamber also recognized that due to the ongoing evolution and incorporation of the understanding of rape into principles of international law, “a conceptual definition is preferable to a mechanical definition of rape” because it will “better accommodate evolving norms of criminal justice.” The Judgment against this defendant is notable for defining rape as an element of genocide, as the Akayesu case had done, and also as a crime against humanity.

Mr. Bemba was president of the “Movement for the Liberation of the Congo” (“MLC”) and Commander-in-Chief of its military unit, the Armée de Libération du Congo (“ALC”), in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”). In these roles, Mr. Bemba had effective authority and control over the MLC, as well as the ALC troops. The ICC found Mr. Bemba criminally responsible for rape, both as a war crime and a crime against humanity, committed by his armed forces during the course of the 2002-2003 U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic (“CAR”). The ICC held that Mr. Bemba failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent or repress the commission of such crimes by his armed forces. This decision is important because it represents the ICC’s first verdict to hold that leaders are accountable for the crimes perpetrated by their subordinates. By employing the doctrine of command responsibility, the ICC’s goal is to prevent leaders from avoiding repercussions for crimes (including sexual crimes) that are committed by the troops under their control.

Between December 6 and 8, 1982 a specialized group of the Guatemalan armed forces executed 251 members of the “Las Dos Erres” community. Among those killed were women and children. Women and girls, in particular, were raped and subjected to forced abortion. Soldiers beat pregnant women, at times jumping on their stomachs causing miscarriage. The case was brought before the Inter-American Court following the State’s inability or unwillingness to seek justice on behalf of the victims and their next of kin. The case against the State alleged violations of Article 1(1): the obligation to respect the rights enshrined in the American Convention on Human Rights; Article 8: the right to a fair trial; and Article 25: the right to judicial protection and enforcement. The Court held that the investigation carried out by the Guatemalan State was insufficient and that the State has a positive obligation to diligently investigate the facts of a given case. With regard to women’s rights, the Court found that the Convention of Belém do Pará, which requires that states diligently investigate and punish acts of violence against women, applied to the present case even though the Convention was not in effect at the time of the massacre. The Court found that the act of raping women during the conflict was a state practice “directed to destroying the dignity of women at a cultural, social, family and individual level” (Case of the “Las dos Erres” Massacre ¶139). The State’s failure to investigate and punish the crimes committed was held to be a violation of the American Convention and the Convention of Belém do Pará and the Court ordered the State to provide various forms of reparation including: restitution, rehabilitation and guarantees of non-repetition. In addition the Court ordered the State to “locate, prosecute, and punish the masterminds and perpetrators” (Case of the “Las dos Erres” Massacre ¶229), prohibited amnesty and mandated that alleged acts of torture and violence against girls and women, in particular, be investigated.

Entre el 6 y el 8 de diciembre de 1982, un grupo especializado de las fuerzas armadas guatemaltecas ejecutó a 251 miembros de la comunidad conocida como "Las Dos Erres." Entre los muertos había mujeres y niños. Las mujeres y las niñas, en particular, fueron violadas y sometidas a abortos forzados cuando los soldados golpearon a las mujeres embarazadas, a veces saltando sobre sus estómagos, causando así abortos involuntarios. El caso se presentó ante la Corte Interamericana tras la incapacidad o falta de voluntad del Estado en reclamar justicia en nombre de las víctimas y sus familiares. El caso contra el Estado alegó violaciones al artículo 1 (1): la obligación de respetar los derechos consagrados en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos; Artículo 8: el derecho a un juicio justo; y Artículo 25: el derecho a la protección judicial y la ejecución. La Corte determinó que la investigación realizada por el gobierno guatemalteco había sido insuficiente y que el Estado tiene la obligación de investigar diligentemente los hechos de cada caso. Con respecto a los derechos de las mujeres, la Corte determinó que la Convención de Belém do Pará, que exige que los estados investiguen y castiguen con diligencia los actos de violencia contra las mujeres, se aplicaban al presente caso, aunque la Convención no estuviera vigente en el momento de la masacre. El Tribunal determinó que el acto de violar a las mujeres en épocas de conflicto era una práctica estatal "dirigida a destruir la dignidad de las mujeres a nivel cultural, social, familiar e individual" (Caso de la Masacre de "Las dos Erres", párrafo 139). El hecho de que el Estado no investigara y sancionara los delitos cometidos era una violación de la Convención Americana. La Convención de Belém do Pará y la Corte le ordenaron al Estado proporcionar diversas formas de reparación, entre ellas: restitución, rehabilitación, y garantías de no repetición. Además, la Corte le ordenó al gobierno "localizar, procesar y sancionar a los autores intelectuales y perpetradores" (Caso de la Masacre de "Las dos Erres", párrafo 229), y le prohibió la amnistía, ordenando que los presuntos actos de tortura y violencia contra niñas y mujeres fueran investigados con particularidad.

While the victim was sleeping, her partner Sebastian Javier Parra Godoy attacked her by striking her in the head. She suffered near-fatal head injuries as a result of the blow. On February 5, 2013, the criminal court in the province of Angol found Mr. Godoy guilty of the crime of attempted intimate femicide. In their ruling, the judges explicitly referenced the fact that the case presented a case of gender-based violence. It concluded that that Parra Godoy had acted as a result of traditional views considering women as subordinate perpetuating stereotypes of violence and coercion. The court stated that in such cases, international standards of human rights such as the Inter-American Convention to Prevent, Punish and Eradication of Violence Against Women and the general recommendations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) should apply. The prosecutor Raul Espinoza explained that the main challenge of the case was the absence of direct evidence because the only potential witnesses were the victim, who was sleeping at the time of the attack and who suffered neurological damage which affected her memory, and the victim’s autistic son, who was mentally handicapped. To bring the case, he relied instead on strong circumstantial evidence.

Mientras la víctima dormía, su compañero Sebastián Javier Parra Godoy la agredió golpeándola en la cabeza. Sufrió heridas en la cabeza casi fatales como resultado del golpe. El 5 de febrero de 2013, el juzgado penal de la provincia de Angol declaró culpable al señor Godoy del delito de intento de femicidio íntimo. En su decisión, los jueces hicieron referencia explícita al hecho de que el caso presentaba un caso de violencia de género. Concluyó que Parra Godoy había actuado como resultado de opiniones tradicionales que consideraban a las mujeres como subordinadas y perpetuaban estereotipos de violencia y coacción. El tribunal señaló que en tales casos deben aplicarse estándares internacionales de derechos humanos como la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer y las recomendaciones generales del Comité para la Eliminación de la Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW). El fiscal Raúl Espinoza explicó que el principal desafío del caso fue la ausencia de evidencia directa porque los únicos testigos potenciales eran la víctima, quien se encontraba durmiendo al momento del ataque y quien sufrió daño neurológico que afectó su memoria, y el que el hijo de la víctima tenía autismo, una discapacidad mental. Para presentar el caso con éxito, se basó en cambio en pruebas circunstanciales sólidas.