Women and Justice: Keywords

Article 57 of the Family Code of Ukraine defines a list of types of property that are not considered joint property of spouses, for example: (i) any property acquired by either spouse before getting married; (ii) any property acquired under a gift agreement or as heritage during the marriage; (iii) any property acquired during marriage with one spouse’s own money; (iv) personal items such as jewelry, even if acquired with money owned jointly by the spouses, etc. However, according to Ukrainian legislation and judicial practice, there is a presumption of joint spousal ownership: it is assumed that all property of the spouses is their joint property and subject to division, until proven otherwise. When deciding whether property belongs to both spouses, Ukrainian courts are guided by criteria including the time of acquisition of the property and the funds with which such property was acquired (source of acquisition). For example, if property was acquired with personal funds during the marriage, the property is not joint property of the spouses, but rather is the personal private property of the spouse who purchased it. At the same time, if it is not confirmed that the property was bought with personal funds, the presumption of joint ownership of the spouses will remain. The spouse contesting the claim that the property is individual property bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of joint. When managing property, Article 59 requires that spouses must consider the interests of the child and other family members who are lawfully authorized to use their property.

Стаття 57 Сімейного кодексу України визначає перелік видів майна, яке не є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя, наприклад: (I) будь-яке майно, набуте одним із подружжя до шлюбу; (II) будь-яке майно, набуте за договором дарування або в порядку спадкування; (III) будь-яке майно, придбане під час шлюбу за особисті кошти одного з подружжя; (IV) особисті речі, такі як ювелірні вироби, навіть якщо вони придбані за кошти, які є спільною власністю подружжя, тощо. Однак, згідно з українським законодавством та судовою практикою, існує презумпція спільної власності подружжя: вважається, що все майно подружжя є їхньою спільною власністю і підлягає поділу, доки не буде доведено інше. Вирішуючи питання про належність майна обом подружжю, українські суди керуються такими критеріями, як час набуття майна та кошти, на які таке майно набуто (джерело набуття). Наприклад, якщо майно було придбано за особисті кошти під час шлюбу, це майно не є спільною власністю подружжя, а є особистою приватною власністю того з подружжя, який його придбав. При цьому, якщо не буде підтверджено факт придбання майна за особисті кошти, презумпція спільної власності подружжя збережеться. Той з подружжя, який заперечує вимогу про те, що майно є індивідуальною власністю, несе тягар спростування презумпції спільної власності. Стаття 59 вимагає, щоб подружжя при управлінні майном зважало на інтереси дитини та інших членів сім’ї, які за законом мають право користуватися їх майном.

The proceedings concerned the plaintiff’s entitlement to an interest in seven properties purchased by the defendant in his name during and after their nine-year relationship. The plaintiff brought a claim under Part 9 of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), requesting that the Court adjust the interests in the properties on the basis of her financial and non-financial contributions to the relationship. While the parties were not married, the court was satisfied that on the balance of probabilities, they were in a genuine domestic relationship, considering factors such as their co-habitation, financial independence and the fact they had a child. In determining the contributions of each party to the relationship, the Court noted that “full value” must be given to the role of either party as homemaker. The plaintiff was not required to demonstrate a link between her contributions as homemaker or parent and the value of the properties in question. The Court acknowledged that the defendant had assumed the full burden of the mortgage commitments of the properties, but also acknowledged that the plaintiff had principal responsibility for the care of her three children. The Court was satisfied that the parties’ contributions were equal, and adjusted the interests in the properties on this basis.

The defendant alleged that he was induced to make and execute an agreement to pay the plaintiff various amounts following the breakdown of their 10-year relationship, including: payment of US $50,000 (with US $30,000 to be paid initially followed by the remainder; this was subsequently amended to US $60,000), payment of the plaintiff’s rental and medical expenses for 12 months, the purchase of furniture and a computer, and the provision of financial support to the plaintiff’s daughter who was studying. The defendant freely paid the plaintiff US $30,000 but did not honor the rest of the proposed agreement. The defendant claimed that the agreement had been entered into by duress on the part of the plaintiff or alternatively, should be set aside for lack of consideration, and therefore counterclaimed the US$30,000 paid under that agreement. In reply, the plaintiff claimed that: (i) there was a common law marriage between the parties for the defendant held himself out as the plaintiff’s husband and father to her children and for all intents and purposes they lived as husband and wife; and, (ii) the defendant entered into the agreement willingly. The Supreme Court concluded that, in the present case, there was no celebration of marriage and, therefore, the parties could not be presumed to have been married under common law. Further, the Supreme Court noted that there was evidence in support of the position that the agreement was the result of blackmail on the part of the plaintiff who held various sensitive documents of the defendant and threatened to report the defendant to the Zambia Revenue Authority if he did not agree to enter into the agreement. The Supreme Court noted that the evidence established that the agreement had been entered into under duress and therefore was capable of being set aside on this basis. However, a party who enters into a contract under duress has the option of ratifying the contract or seeking to avoid it once the duress has come to an end. The Supreme Court noted that while the defendant paid the US $30,000 with full knowledge of all the circumstances (including suspecting that the plaintiff no longer had any sensitive documents in her possession), the defendant could not have legally ratified the contract, as it was invalid for lack of consideration (in particular, any consideration would be past consideration because the relationship had ended and the plaintiff was supposed to move out of the defendant’s house anyway as she had no legal right to continue staying there). Accordingly, the Supreme Court ordered the plaintiff to refund US$30,000 without interest to the defendant on the basis that the plaintiff should not be unjustly enriched by the threat (with costs to be borne by the plaintiff, to be agreed upon or taxed in default of agreement).

Ms. Esseku and Mr. Inkoom had been married for 30 years. The husband claimed to have divorced his wife in 1995 under Muslim tradition and custom. They had one property together, which Mr. Inkoom sold without consulting Ms. Esseku or their five children, all of whom he evicted off the property. The trial court held that the property was a joint property of both parties, and nullified the sale. Examining the evidence, the Superior Court affirmed the holding because Ms. Esseku had made a “substantial contribution” to the property by building an additional two bedrooms to the house. Furthermore, the Court held that even if she had not made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of the property, she still would have been entitled to an equal share of the property because of her valuable considerations made during the marriage, like “the performance of household chores” and the “maintenance of a congenial domestic environment for the respondent to operate and acquire properties.” As such, both parties were entitled to equal shares of the property, and Mr. Inkoom could not sell the house without consulting her first.